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Debunking Intellectual Property Myths:
Cross-Cultural Experiments on Perceptions
of Property
Gregory N. Mandel,* Kristina R. Olson,** & Anne A. Fast***
For decades, the prevailing view in the United States and
many Western countries has been that China does not
appropriately respect intellectual property rights. These beliefs lie
at the heart of President Donald Trump’s current trade war with
China. Despite substantial geopolitical debate over differences
between American and Chinese attitudes towards intellectual
property rights, and despite the critical effects that such attitudes
have on international economic markets and the function of
intellectual property systems, empirical evidence of these attitudes
is largely lacking. This Article presents original experimental
survey research that explores cross-cultural differences between
American and Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property
rights, personal property rights, and real property rights.
The results of the studies are somewhat counterintuitive.
First, Chinese participants are found to have more consistent
preferences towards different types of property rights than
Americans. In a series of vignettes designed to test attitudes
towards patented subject matter, copyrighted subject matter,
tangible personal property, and real property, Chinese responses
were more consistent and less context driven. Second, Americans
do identify a preference for stronger intellectual property rights
than Chinese, but only where infringement is committed by a
private party for private benefit. Where infringement is conducted
for public benefit, whether by a private or a governmental entity,
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Associate Professor Ma Biyu, Yunnan University Law School, for her assistance in carrying
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supported by the National Science Foundation under Grant No. 1324138 and 1322514.
**Associate Professor of Psychology, University of Washington.
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Chinese and Americans tend to have the same attitudes towards
intellectual property rights. Third, Americans display a lower
regard for intellectual property rights than for tangible property
rights in most contexts, a differential that is not echoed in Chinese
responses. The distinctions that Americans draw based on the use
to which property is put, and between intellectual property and
tangible property, is not consistent with United States law.
Our experiments reveal that the ongoing debates over Chinese
attitudes towards intellectual property rights miss the mark in
certain regards. Chinese and American preferences for property
rights are more similar than most have assumed, and the manners
in which they differ are inconsistent with most proffered theories.
These results provide important lessons for the future of
international intellectual property rights relations, discourse,
and enforcement.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, the prevailing view among Western governments,
industries, and experts has been that the Chinese government and
populace have a widespread disregard for intellectual property
rights.1 This assessment has led to significant trade, political, and
economic disputes.2 China has enacted a series of stronger, more
Westernized intellectual property laws during this period.3
Although China’s approach to intellectual property is
strengthening, many in the United States and other Western
countries still believe that, despite China’s tougher intellectual
property laws, it is not doing enough to enforce these rights and
that infringement runs rampant.4 Such beliefs are the primary
1. ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN
CONTEMPORARY CHINA 167 (2005); Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the
BRIC Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317, 333 (2006) (“The sheer volume of copyright and
trademark piracy in China is staggering.”); Xuan-Thao Nguyen, The China We Hardly Know:
Revealing the New China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 773, 773 (2011) (“The
long-held and virtually unquestioned view about China from the United States and other
Western nations is that China has a total disregard for intellectual property rights.”); Shruti
Rana, The Global Battle over Copyright Reform: Developing the Rule of Law in the Chinese Business
Context, 53 STAN. J. INT’L L. 89, 92 (2017) (“[B]usinesses and governments around the world
have repeatedly singled out Chinese companies as among the world’s most notorious
copyright pirates.”).
2. Bird, supra note 1, at 329; Julia Cheng, China’s Copyright System: Rising to the Spirit
of TRIPS Requires an Internal Focus and WTO Membership, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1941, 1943
(1998); Rana, supra note 1, at 91; Wei Shi & Robert Weatherley, Harmony or Coercion?
China-EU Trade Dispute Involving Intellectual Property Enforcement, 25 WIS. INT’L L.J. 439,
442–43 (2007).
3. Bird, supra note 1, at 334; Scott J. Palmer, An Identity Crisis: Regime Legitimacy and
the Politics of Intellectual Property Rights in China, 8 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 449, 450 (2001);
Rana, supra note 1, at 91–92.
4. Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon Is Over: The U.S.-China WTO Intellectual Property
Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 96, 105 (2008); Rana, supra note 1, at 126 (noting that while
China has made significant efforts, some believe that such efforts and enforcement are
lacking); Anne M. Wall, Intellectual Property Protection in China: Enforcing Trademark Rights, 17
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 341, 416 (2006); William Weightman, China’s Progress on Intellectual
Property Rights (Yes, Really), THE DIPLOMAT (Jan. 20, 2018), https://thediplomat.com/
2018/01/chinas-progress-on-intellectual-property-rights-yes-really/ (“China has become
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driver of the current trade war between the United States
and China.5
A number of experts have argued that the challenges of
intellectual property enforcement in China are unsurprising
because efforts to introduce Western notions of intellectual
property rights into China largely have ignored the differences
between Chinese and Western values, cultures, and institutions.6
Rather, Western nations have attempted to compel China to ramp
up intellectual property protection through diplomatic and
financial pressure.7 This goal, for example, is an explicit objective of
increasingly innovative and has demonstrated a serious resolve to enforce an effective
IPR regime.”).
5. Statement from President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/
statement-president-donald-j-trump-additional-proposed-section-301-remedies/
(“Following a thorough investigation under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, the United
States Trade Representative (USTR) determined that China has repeatedly engaged in
practices to unfairly obtain America’s intellectual property. . . . China’s illicit trade practices
− ignored for years by Washington − have destroyed thousands of American factories and
millions of American jobs.”); Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China,
WHITE HOUSE (June 15, 2018) [hereinafter Statement by the President Regarding Trade with China
(June 15, 2018)], https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-presidentregarding-trade-china/ (“China has, for example, long been engaging in several unfair
practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual property and technology.”);
U.S. Delegation, Section 2: Protection of American Technology and Intellectual Property,
BALANCING THE TRADE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE PEOPLE’S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, https://xqdoc.imedao.com/16329fa0c8b2da913fc9058b.pdf (providing
a variety of intellectual property demands among the United States’ list of demands before
talks in Beijing to try to resolve the trade dispute); see Bryce Baschuk, U.S. Takes Aim at China
in WTO, Escalating Stakes of Trade War, BLOOMBERG LAW (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X640AKN0000000?bna_news_filter=iplaw&jcsearch=BNA%2520000001668c0ed347ad778fdee8250000#jcite (discussing the United
States WTO complaint against Chinese intellectual property rights practices).
6. WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 2 (1995); see Jennifer A. Crane, Riding the Tiger: A
Comparison of Intellectual Property Rights in the United States and the People’s Republic of China,
7 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 95 (2008) (reaching the same conclusion); Peter K. Yu, From
Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM.
U. L. REV. 131 (2000) (also reaching the same conclusion).
7. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 1; Bird, supra note 1, at 334 (“Threats of a trade war
encouraged China to enact more stringent copyright laws and close pirating factories.”);
Patricia E. Campbell & Michael Pecht, The Emperor’s New Clothes: Intellectual Property
Protections in China, 7 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 69, 72–75 (2012); Jacques deLisle, Lex Americana:
United States Legal Assistance, American Legal Models, and Legal Change in the Post-Communist
World and Beyond, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 179, 211, 222 (1999) (“The United States
relied on pressure, more than assistance, in its quest to influence the shape of China’s
intellectual property law.”); Gregory N. Mandel, Leveraging the International Economy of
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President Donald Trump’s increased tariffs on Chinese goods.8
Trying to implement intellectual property via pressure, however,
will not incorporate its concepts into the culture and consciousness
of Chinese people.9 As a consequence of this approach, there is a
disconnect between China’s reasons for implementing intellectual
property laws and the evolution of popular attitudes towards
the laws.
Despite the long-running debates over intellectual property
protection and about differing American versus Chinese attitudes
towards intellectual property rights, no one has ever tested these
underlying hypotheses. This is striking, particularly given the
current trade disputes and that America and China lead the world
in granting intellectual property rights.10 There are data that
Intellectual Property, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 738–39 (2014) (discussing the diplomatic and
financial pressures); Shi & Weatherley, supra note 2, at 445 (“Since the beginning of the 1990s,
in order to achieve instant improvement of IPR enforcement, the United States has frequently
leveraged a series of unilateral mechanisms—trade wars, non-renewal of Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status, and opposition to entry into the WTO—to push China towards
stronger protection of the U.S. IPR.”).
8. Presidential Memorandum, Actions by the United States Related to the Section 301
Investigation of China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, or Actions Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation, 83 Fed. Reg. 13099 (Mar. 22, 2018) (discussing the
actions the United States will take in response to the Trade Representative’s findings that
China is harming American intellectual property); Statement from President Donald J. Trump
on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies, supra note 5 (“On April 3, 2018, the USTR
announced approximately $50 billion in proposed tariffs on imports from China as an initial
means to obtain the elimination of policies and practices identified in the investigation. . . .
[T]he United States is still prepared to have discussions in further support of our
commitment to achieving free, fair, and reciprocal trade and to protect the technology and
intellectual property of American companies and American people.”); Statement by the
President Regarding Trade with China (June 15, 2018), supra note 5 (“These tariffs are essential
to preventing further unfair transfers of American technology and intellectual property to
China, which will protect American jobs.”); Statement from the President Regarding Trade with
China, WHITE HOUSE (June 18, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china-2/ (“China apparently has no
intention of changing its unfair practices related to the acquisition of American intellectual
property and technology. Rather than altering those practices, it is now threatening United
States companies, workers, and farmers who have done nothing wrong.”).
9. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 54; Crane, supra note 6; Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and
Perspectives: An Attempt to Use Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property
Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 3, 16 (2001); see also Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The
Battle to Define Asia’s Intellectual Property Law: From TPP to RCEP, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 331
(2018) (discussing current debates over intellectual property treaties among various Asian
countries including China and treaties with respect to the United States).
10. See, e.g., Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP.
ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_pct_201 8.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (identifying the United States and China as first and second,
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indicate higher intellectual property infringement rates in China
than in the United States.11 It is not feasible, however, to extrapolate
from these data to reach conclusions about actual American and
Chinese attitudes. A differential in infringement rates could result
from different attitudes towards intellectual property rights, but it
could also result from different efforts or means of enforcement,
different economic pressures, or other factors.
Social and cultural psychologists have studied the cultural
differences between Americans and Chinese in a variety of other
contexts.12 Such research has found that East Asians tend to have a
more collectivistic and interdependent view of the self, while
Westerners tend to have a more individualistic and independent
view.13 These results are consistent with some of the arguments
about the effects of Chinese and American cultures on attitudes
towards intellectual property rights, but none of the studies have
examined attitudes towards intellectual or other property rights.
The present study is designed to begin to remedy this gap.
We recruited American college students at a large American
university and Chinese college students at a large Chinese

respectively, in Patent Cooperation Treaty application filings by country in 2018); Who Filed
the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2018?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2018.pdf
(last visited Mar. 15, 2020) (identifying the United States, Germany, and China as first
through third, respectively, in Madrid Agreement trademark application filings by country
in 2018).
11. See, e.g., Matt Rosoff, The Countries Where People Steal the Most Data, BUS. INSIDER
(July 7, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.sg/software-piracy-rates-and-value-bycountry-2016-7/?r=US&IR=T (“Software piracy is a lot more rampant in China than the U.S.,
but the value of unlicensed software in the U.S. is still the highest in the world.”).
12. Guo-Ming Chen, Differences in Self-Disclosure Patterns Among Americans Versus
Chinese: A Comparative Study, 26 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCH. 84, 84–91 (1995); Rosina C. Chia,
Jamie L. Moore, Ka Nei Lam, C.J. Chuang & B.S. Cheng, Cultural Differences in Gender Role
Attitudes Between Chinese and American Students, 31 SEX ROLES 23, 23–30 (1994); Li-Jun Ji,
Kaiping Peng & Richard E. Nisbett, Culture, Control, and Perception of Relationships in the
Environment, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 943, 943–55 (2000); Michael W. Morris &
Kaiping Peng, Culture and Cause: American and Chinese Attributions for Social and Physical
Events, 67 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 949, 949–71 (1994); Deborah Stipek, Differences
Between Americans and Chinese in the Circumstances Evoking Pride, Shame, and Guilt, 29 J. CROSSCULTURAL PSYCH. 616, 616–29 (1998).
13. Hazel Rose Markus & Shinobu Kitayama, Culture and Self: Implications for
Cognition, Emotion, and Motivation, 98 PSYCH. REV. 223, 223–53 (1991); Daphna Oyserman &
Spike Wing-Sing Lee, Priming “Culture”: Culture as Situated Cognition, in HANDBOOK OF
CULTURAL PSYCHOLOGY 255, 255–79 (Shinobu Kitayama & Dov Cohen eds., 2007); Harry C.
Triandis, Individualism-Collectivism and Personality, 69 J. PERSONALITY 907, 907–24 (2001).
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university to take part in a series of survey experiments designed
to test attitudes towards intellectual property, personal property,
and real property rights. These studies do not test whether the
United States’ or China’s property laws are apt, or whether their
levels of enforcement are sufficient. Rather, the studies explore
popular American and Chinese beliefs about the appropriateness
of various types of property rights protection.
The results were somewhat surprising. When queried about
support for personal, real, and intellectual property rights in
general, Americans and Chinese supported property rights in each
category at about the same level. When queried about specific
scenarios involving property rights, however, Americans tended
to prefer stronger property rights than Chinese. That said,
the American responses were highly context dependent and, in
some situations, American and Chinese responses were not
statistically different.
The specific scenarios we tested included a variety of types of
property (patent, copyright, personal, and real) and a variety of
types of taking of property rights (a private party taking for a
private purpose, a private party taking for a public purpose, and a
public entity taking for a public purpose). Chinese responses to
these differing circumstances were substantially more consistent
than Americans across the twelve scenarios (four property domains
by three taking types). Regardless of the type of property at issue,
the entity taking the property, and the use to which the property
was being put, Chinese participants gave relatively similar answers
about their preferences for property rights. American responses, on
the other hand, varied significantly.
The divisions that Americans drew concerning property rights
were largely inconsistent with actual property law in the United
States. For example, American participants drew a sharp
distinction depending on the use to which property was being put.
Americans were strongly opposed to property being taken for a
private purpose (by a private party). They were close to equipoise,
however, when property was taken for a public goal, regardless of
whether a private or public party took the property. This distinction
between a private party taking property for a private purpose
versus for a public purpose is not supported in the law.
Intriguingly, Americans (and Chinese) also concluded that
personal property should be protected to a greater extent than
225
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patents, copyrights, or land. This preference for personal property
rights existed whether the land rights infringed involved merely
trespass or the full taking of real property. This distinction also is
not consistent with the law.
The results reported here shed some light on long-running
debates over the purpose of property law. The American responses,
favoring the use to which property is put over the rights of the
user, indicate that public preferences are more consistent with
a utilitarian, rather than deontological, view of private property
rights. The strong protection of personal property rights
also provides some support for personhood-based theories of
property law.
Taken as a whole, these studies also indicate that those on all
sides of the debates over Chinese attitudes towards intellectual
property law have been making erroneous assumptions. Chinese
attitudes towards intellectual property track Chinese attitudes
towards tangible property relatively closely. It is not the case that
Chinese tend to think of intellectual property exceptionally, but
that they appear to have different attitudes towards property rights
in general than Americans, a difference that is hardly surprising
given China’s different history and culture.
Further, Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights
bear significant resemblance to American attitudes in certain
regards—greater resemblance than many would likely predict.
For example, in both the copyright and patent protection scenarios,
Americans and Chinese had statistically similar responses for both
private and public takings so long as they are for public purposes.
The Chinese and American responses differed more in the personal
and real property scenarios than in the intellectual property
vignettes. These results have significant implications for the
future of international intellectual property rights enforcement
and discourse.
This Article is presented in three parts. Part I describes the
differing histories of intellectual, personal, and real property rights
in China and the United States. This Part also surveys prior
psychological research on cultural differences between Americans
and Chinese. We present our study design, methodology, and
results in Part II. Part III discusses the implications of our survey
experiments with respect to American and Chinese attitudes
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towards property rights in general and international intellectual
property debates in particular.
I.

CULTURE, PROPERTY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

In 1995, William Alford published his seminal work on
intellectual property law and culture, To Steal a Book is an Elegant
Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization (hereinafter
To Steal a Book).14 In this volume, Alford attacked the received
wisdom of both Chinese and Western scholars that imperial China
(221 BC–AD 1911) had developed an indigenous type of intellectual
property rights.15 Rather, Alford argued, scholars had
misconstrued governmental control as intellectual property law,
and in fact Chinese social and political culture created an
environment that was largely antithetical to the notion of private
intellectual property rights.16 To Steal a Book received significant
acclaim and has become one of the most heavily cited intellectual
property books of all time.17 While many concurred and were
convinced by Alford’s argument,18 others criticized it as not fully
representative or a misunderstanding of Chinese culture.19
14. ALFORD, supra note 6.
15. Id. at 2 (citing CHENGSI ZHENG & MICHAEL PENDLETON, COPYRIGHT LAW IN CHINA
(CCH International 1991)); Richard Adelstein & Steven Peretz, The Competition of Technologies
and Market for Ideas: Copyright and Fair Use—An Evolutionary Perspective, 5 INT’L REV. L. &
ECON. 209 (1985); Zou Shencheng, Baohu Banquan Shi Yu He Shi Heguo (The Protection of
Copyright Started When and in What Country?), 63 FAXUE YANJIU (RSCH. LEGAL
STUD.) 63 (1984).
16. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 119.
17. A LexisNexis search for the title, for example, returns over 250 citation results.
18. E.g., David Briglia, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law
in Chinese Civilization by William P. Alford, 19 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 343, 347 (1995)
(“William Alford offers a concise, remarkably readable, and illuminative account of the
cultural history behind China’s vexing intractability.”); Thomas Buoye, William P. Alford, To
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 40 AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 514 (1996) (“If Alford is correct, and I believe he is . . . .”); Charles R. Stone,
What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary Observations on Classical Chinese Attitudes Toward
What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 207–09 (2008) (concluding that
“Alford’s book accurately explains” that Chinese authors rarely thought of copying from
other works as stealing, even when copying whole chapters, because the rephrasing of
historical works was considered inaccurate); Guy Yonay, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant
Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 537, 541
(1995) (referring to Alford’s analysis as “convincing” and stating, “[i]n all, the book proposes
an excellent theory of legal history in China and of legal change in general”).
19. Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an Elegant
Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REGUL. 1, 12 (2006) (arguing that Alford has
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The history of intellectual property rights and private property
rights in China is lengthy and complex. Though the history of such
property rights in the United States is more linear, it too contains
nuances. The following sections provide an overview of intellectual
property, personal property, and real property rights in China and
the United States.
A.

Intellectual Property Rights Across Cultures

Prior to Alford’s work, scholars tended to believe that the
concept of copyright protection arose in various societies following
their invention of mass printing techniques.20 Woodblock printing
was invented during the Tang Dynasty (AD 618–907) in China,21
and a number of historians trace the development of copyright
protection in China to this period.22 Other scholars trace the
development of copyright law in China to the invention of movable
type during the Song Dynasty (AD 960–1279), which would still
predate European copyright law by centuries.23 Correspondingly,
misunderstood the Confucian perspective); Amy Rosen, China vs. United States: A
Cosmopolitan Copyright Comparison, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. POL’Y 1 (2014) (“The scholarship
that uses Confucianism to explain why intellectual property is not salient in Chinese culture,
such as Alford’s, does not consider other factors and severely oversimplifies the complexities
of Confucianism.”); Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What If China Is Not
a Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341 (contending that Alford presented an incomplete
picture concerning the impact of Confucianism on intellectual property protection and
enforcement in China); Anna M. Han, To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual
Property Law in Chinese Civilization by William P. Alford, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1265, 1269
(1996) (arguing that Alford’s book is inconsistent and violates Alford’s own earlier
admonition to take a comprehensive approach to the study of intellectual property); see also
Peter K. Yu, A Half-Century of Scholarship on the Chinese Intellectual Property System, 67 AM. U.
L. REV. 1045, 1094–97 (2018) [hereinafter Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship] (discussing Alford’s
book and the diversity of philosophic and cultural strands within Chinese history and
culture).
20. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 9; Stone, supra note 18; ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note
15, at 11.
21. SUSAN DOYLE, JALEEN GROVE & WHITNEY SHERMAN, HISTORY OF ILLUSTRATION 76
(2018); PETER GANEA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 205
(Christopher Heath ed., 2005).
22. GUAN H. TANG, COPYRIGHT AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN CHINA 65 (2011); Stone,
supra note 18; ZHENG & PENDLETON, supra note 15; Shencheng, supra note 15.
23. TANG, supra note 22, at 65–66; Stone, supra note 18. Certain of the claims that China
invented “copyright protection” are actually rooted in notions of prohibiting plagiarism. Id.
Intellectual property law is distinct from preventing plagiarism, though this is a common
fallacy among lay individuals. Gregory N. Mandel, Anne A. Fast & Kristina R. Olson,
Intellectual Property Law’s Plagiarism Fallacy, 2015 BYU L. REV. 915 (2016) [hereinafter
Plagiarism Fallacy]; see also Gregory N. Mandel, What Is IP for? Experiments in Lay and Expert
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the development of Western copyright law has its origins in
the invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century and
the widespread dissemination of printed matter that this
invention enabled.24
1. Intellectual property development in China
Alford challenged the conventional understanding that
Chinese intellectual property law developed in imperial China.25 In
his view, imperial Chinese law did include restrictions on
publication and reprinting of materials, but these restrictions were
based on the desire to control the dissemination of heterodox
materials, not to protect authorial rights.26 Thus, at various historic
times, China maintained laws requiring prepublication review of
printed matter and prohibiting the unauthorized reproduction of
government materials.27 These laws were designed to control the
dissemination of ideas for purposes related to governmental
legitimization, political order, and stability, rather than to provide
any form of private intellectual property protection for authors or
printers.28 Similarly, claims of early Chinese protection of
trademarks also reflect the government’s exercise of its authority
for the purposes of controlling expression and the dissemination of
what it viewed as unfavorable symbols.29
The absence of intellectual property law in imperial China is not
entirely surprising given certain qualities of Eastern and Chinese
culture. Eastern cultures tend to view creativity as integrating
contributions from many people and sources across time into a
current idea or invention.30 Confucius famously stated, “I transmit
Perceptions, 90 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 659 (2016) (reporting that intellectual property attorney
opinions differ from lay public opinion concerning the basis for intellectual property rights).
24. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984) (“From
its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment—the printing
press—that gave rise to the original need for copyright protection.”); Gary D. Liebcap,
Property Rights in Economic History: Implications for Research, 23 EXPLS. ECON. HIST. 227 (1986).
25. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 9.
26. Id. at 16–17.
27. Yu, supra note 9, at 4; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 17.
28. Yu, supra note 9, at 4; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 17, 24.
29. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 24–25.
30. Gregory N. Mandel, Left-Brain Versus Right-Brain: Competing Conceptions of
Creativity in Intellectual Property Law, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 327 (2010); Stone, supra note
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rather than create,” seeing his role as restating and passing on the
wisdom and insights of his ancestors without necessarily adding
anything new.31 Under this view, copying is not only permissible,
but a noble way to show respect for one’s ancestors; to the contrary,
it is private ownership that is immoral.32 The emphasis on
cooperative effort, the focus on society rather than the individual,
and the importance of links to the past all militate against thinking
of intellectual creation and innovation as entitled to private
property protection.33
Conceptions of a sovereign’s role in Chinese culture also likely
contributed to the lack of intellectual property protection.
Traditionally, a ruler in China was viewed as bearing a fiduciary
and moral duty to the populace, one that placed the responsibility
for nurturing the development of citizens in the ruler’s hands.34
From this perspective, respect for the ruler’s decisions concerning
appropriate ideas and material to disseminate is unsurprising.35
This understanding helps to explain Chinese governmental
restrictions on publication during the imperial period. Although
the government did sometimes protect printers from republication
of their works, and guilds from the reproduction of certain symbols
and materials, the printers and guilds had no individual rights.36
Rather, the government exercised its authority in these cases
in order to maintain political control over discourse and foster
social harmony.37
The lack of intellectual property protection in China was not a
significant issue for China until trade with the West began to open
18; Carla Hesse, The Rise of Intellectual Property, 700 B.C.–A.D. 2000: An Idea in the Balance, 131
DÆDALUS 26, 27 (2002); Yu, supra note 9, at 16–19; ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–20. But see WEI
SHI, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE GLOBAL TRADING SYSTEM: EU-CHINA PERSPECTIVE
106–07 (2008) (contending role of Confucian philosophy is overstated and inaccurate).
31. Hesse, supra note 30, at 27; Yu, supra note 9, at 19.
32. Yu, supra note 9, at 16–21; Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and
Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996).
33. Edward J. Walneck, The Patent Troll or Dragon?: How Quantity Issues and Chinese
Nationalism Explain Recent Trends in Chinese Patent Law, 31 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L. 435
(2014); Brent T. Yonehara, Enter the Dragon: China’s WTO Accession, Film Piracy and Prospects
for the Enforcement of Copyright Laws, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 389 (2002); Stone, supra note 18;
ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–20.
34. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 19–23.
35. Id. at 24.
36. Id. at 24–25.
37. Id.; Yu, supra note 9, at 4.
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up in the nineteenth century.38 Initially, this trade involved bulk
commodities (such as tea, raw silk, and opium), rendering
trademark or other intellectual property protection unnecessary.39
As trade relationships evolved and brand names became more
important, the need for some form of trademark protection was
more pressing.40 In part as a result, China entered into treaties with
Western nations in the early twentieth century that included
trademark, patent, and copyright provisions.41 These treaties,
however, failed to establish a functional intellectual property
regime. For example, although they provided for trademark
registration, they did not require registration, identify who could
register a mark, or specify the rights provided by registration.42
In a similar vein, the patent provisions of the treaties provided that
foreign rights would exist only after China created a patent office
and enacted patent laws, but provided no timetable for
such action.43
The end of dynastic Chinese rule in the early twentieth century
led to a period of instability before the Kuomintang and Chiang
Kai-shek took power in 1928.44 China began to enact substantive
trademark, copyright, and patent laws at this time.45 There
remained, however, almost no practical enforcement, or even
popular awareness, of such laws during this period.46 As Alford
writes, “fundamentally, these laws failed to achieve their stated
objectives because they presumed a legal structure, and indeed, a

38. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 32–34; Yu, supra note 9, at 5–6.
39. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 33–38.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 37–38; TANG, supra note 22, at 66. The first intellectual property laws in China
were enacted in the early twentieth century, including the Great Qing Copyright Law of
1910. See NORWOOD F. ALLMAN, HANDBOOK ON THE PROTECTION OF TRADE-MARKS, PATENTS,
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADE-NAMES IN CHINA 112–21 (1924) (providing an English translation of
the law); Li Yufeng & Catherine W. Ng, Understanding the Great Qing Copyright Law of 1910,
56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 767 (2009).
42. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 37.
43. Id. at 38.
44. CONRAD SCHIROKAUER & MIRANDA BROWN, A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHINESE
CIVILIZATION 286 (2012).
45. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 50–51; Brian J. Safran, A Critical Look at Western Perceptions
of China’s Intellectual Property System, 3 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 135, 138 (2012).
46. See ALFORD, supra note 6, at 52–55; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7.
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legal consciousness, that did not then exist in China and, most
likely, could not have flourished at that time.”47
The Communist Party and Mao Zedong came to power in 1949
and ushered in a new, socialist political and economic system of
government.48 Socialist concepts of intellectual property were more
consistent with traditional Chinese notions of creation than
Western intellectual property ideals had been.49 Marx viewed
invention and creation as a social, not individual, endeavor
directed at a social product.50 Though Marxist views of the social
nature of creation and Confucian views of the cultural nature of
creation were significantly distinct, each conceived of creation as a
collective endeavor, not an individual one. Consequently, neither
supported private, individual intellectual property rights.51 In
addition, the socialist perspective of the hierarchical need to control
the flow of information to the populace was entirely consistent with
the approach that had been taken in imperial China.52
Communist China did enact certain types of intellectual
property laws in the 1950s. These included a two-track approach to
rights in inventions.53 The primary track involved the state granting
certificates of invention to select inventors.54 The state had the right
to use and authorize others to use the invention, while the inventor

47. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 53.
48. TIMOTHY CHEEK, MAO ZEDONG AND CHINA’S REVOLUTIONS: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 1 (2002); Safran, supra note 45, at 138–39.
49. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 56–57; Yu, supra note 9, at 21–22.
50. Jing-Kai Syz, Note, Expanding the Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China: A
Proposal for Patent Protection of Computer Programs, 5 J. CHINESE L. 349, 353 n.18 (1991); see
KARL MARX, EARLY WRITINGS 157 (T. B. Bottomore ed. & trans., 1963) (“Even when I carry
out scientific work, etc., an activity which I can seldom conduct in direct association with
other men, I perform a social, because human, act.”); KARL MARX & FREDERICH ENGELS,
CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, VOLUME I 330 n.4 (Frederich Engels, ed.,
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., 1887) (“A critical history of technology
would show how little any of the inventions of the 18th century are the work of a
single individual.”).
51. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; Yonehara, supra note 33, at 74–77.
52. A saying in China during the Cultural Revolution was, “Is it necessary for a steel
worker to put his name on a steel ingot that he produces in the course of his duty? If not,
why should a member of the intelligentsia enjoy the privilege of putting his name on what
he produces?” ALFORD, supra note 6, at 65.
53. Id. at 57–58; PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 141–42 (Sweet &
Maxwell Asia 2003); GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 2.
54. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; FENG, supra note 53, at 141–42; GANEA & PATTLOCH,
supra note 21, at 2.
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was entitled to recognition and financial rewards based on the
savings produced by the invention.55 Alternatively, the inventor
could receive patent-like rights entitling them to control over the
use and distribution of the invention.56 Despite these laws, and
other laws providing certain exclusive use rights for trademarks,
there were only a handful of patents issued in this period and
unauthorized infringement was widespread.57 There was no
equivalent to copyright protection at this time, and the state
exercised control over what was published, although the state
could provide authors with “basic payments” based on the number
of copies printed and a right to prevent alteration of a work.58
These limited intellectual property protections were sharply
curtailed during the cultural revolutions of the 1960s and replaced
with laws that vested intellectual property rights exclusively with
the state.59 As the government exercised growing control over the
dissemination of ideas, materials, and discourse, citizens were
encouraged and pressured to not even identify their roles in
creation or invention.60 Following the end of the Cultural
Revolution and arrest of the Gang of Four in the late 1970s, Deng
Xiaoping came to power and ushered in the “four
modernizations.”61 China began to revise its approach to
intellectual property protection and the precursors to today’s laws
were introduced.62
China started to develop a more modern and Western
intellectual property system in 1982, promulgating a new law for
the protection of trademarks.63 In an effort to incentivize
innovation, China also enacted a new and stronger Patent Law in
55. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 57; FENG, supra note 53, at 141–42; GANEA & PATTLOCH,
supra note 21, at 3; Safran, supra note 45, at 138–39; see Gregory N. Mandel, Innovation Rewards:
Towards Solving the Twin Market Failures of Public Goods, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 303 (2016)
(proposing a rewards system based on benefit for public goods inventions).
56. FENG, supra note 53, at 142; GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3.
57. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 61.
58. Id. at 59–60; Hu, supra note 32, at 104–05.
59. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 62–63.
60. Id. at 63–64; see Yu, supra note 6, at 136–37.
61. RICHARD BAUM, BURYING MAO: CHINESE POLITICS IN THE AGE OF DENG XIAOPING
81 (1996); LIBR. OF CONG. FED. RSCH. DIV., CHINA: A COUNTRY STUDY 54–58 (Robert L.
Worden et al. eds., 1988); Safran, supra note 45, at 139.
62. Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7, at 72; Safran, supra note 45, at 139–40.
63. Trademark Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 23, 1982, effective Mar. 1, 1983).
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1984.64 These laws were adopted over the objections of some that
intellectual property rights were antithetical to socialist
principles.65 In the early 1990s, China added a copyright law and a
law prohibiting unfair competition.66 This series of laws
represented a major shift in China’s approach to intellectual
property protection, although initially the Chinese government
made only limited efforts to enforce such rights.67
As a result, through the 1980s and 1990s, intellectual property
protection provided little remedy in China, and intellectual
property infringement ran relatively rampant.68 In 1989 the United
States placed China on its intellectual property Priority Watch List
due to concerns about infringement, and in 1994, the United States
Trade Representative famously referred to intellectual property
rights enforcement in China as “sporadic at best and virtually nonexistent for copyrighted works.”69 During this period, copyright
laws were sometimes used by the state to control the publication
and dissemination of printed works.70
In the twenty-first century, China re-enacted and amended
many of its intellectual property laws, each time making them
stronger and providing tougher enforcement rules.71 China also
64. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1, 1985).
65. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3; Mark Sidel, Copyright, Trademark and
Patent Law in the People’s Republic of China, 21 TEX. INT’L L.J. 259, 282–83 (1986).
66. Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Sept. 7, 1990, effective June 1, 1991); Law Against Unfair
Competition of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Sept. 2, 1993, effective Dec. 1, 1993).
67. GANEA & PATTLOCH, supra note 21, at 3; Graham J. Chynoweth, Reality Bites: How
the Biting Reality of Piracy in China Is Working to Strengthen Its Copyright Laws, 2 DUKE L. &
TECH. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (referring to China’s 1990 copyright law and 1982 trademark law as
having “produced more bark than bite”); see ALFORD, supra note 6, at 73–80, 85; Hu, supra
note 32, at 105; Campbell & Pecht, supra note 7, at 74.
68. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 85–92; Yu, supra note 6, at 146, 165; Yonehara, supra note
33, at 66.
69. CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30555, CHINA–U.S. TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMPLIANCE
ISSUES (2000), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20001207_RL30555_001f38e95f94b
933570819b037242688bfe13d25.pdf; see Bird, supra note 1, at 339–40.
70. ALFORD, supra note 6, at 79.
71. The Patent Law was amended in 1992, 2000, and 2008, and a fourth revision of the
Patent Law is currently under consideration. Patent Law of the People’s Republic of China
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1,
2009), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=178664; Yu, Half-Century of
Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1046. The Copyright Law was amended in 2001 and 2010.
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began taking greater steps to enforce its intellectual property
laws.72 During this period, China signed a number of international
intellectual property rights treaties, culminating with China’s
accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 and concomitant
entrance into the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) in 2001.73 Perhaps most
significantly, over the last decade China has embarked upon an
explicit national policy to improve the creation, use, and protection
of intellectual property rights.74
These steps have led to significant development of intellectual
property rights in China. For example, in 2017 China had the
second largest number of international applications filed under the
Patent Cooperation Treaty (to the United States) and the third
largest number of Madrid Agreement trademark applications (to
the United States and Germany).75 There are still complaints about
the level of intellectual property rights enforcement in China,76 and
Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., Feb. 26, 2010, effective Apr. 1, 2010), art. 4, http://www.wipo.int/
wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=186569; Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1046. A
revised unfair competition law just became effective in 2018. Law of the People’s Republic of
China Against Unfair Competition (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., Nov. 4, 2017, effective Jan. 1, 2018); FENG, supra note 53, at ix; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates
to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV.
901, 906–23, 975 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, Pirates to Partners (Episode II)]; Weightman, supra note 4.
72. Joseph A. Massey, The Emperor Is Far Away: China’s Enforcement of Intellectual
Property Rights Protection, 1986–2006, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 231, 236 (2006); Nguyen, supra note 1,
at 789–806; Yu, Pirates to Partners (Episode II), supra note 71, at 911; Jessica Jiong Zhou,
Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 415, 431
(2002); Weightman, supra note 4; see also Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1081–
82 (discussing the evolution of China’s intellectual property system from one that
transplanted foreign laws to one that is focusing more on internal needs).
73. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1197, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299; TANG, supra note 22, at 70–71.
74. State Intell. Prop. Off. of China, China’s Intellectual Property Protection in 2008,
CNIPA (July 17, 2013), http://english.cnipa.gov.cn/lawpolicy/white/915591.htm.
75. Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231; Who
Filed the Most Madrid Trademark Applications in 2017?, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographic_madrid_2017.
pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2020); Who Filed the Most PCT Patent Applications in 2017?,
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/
infographic_pct_2017.pdf (last visited Jan. 29, 2020).
76. See, e.g., OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2017 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 28 (2017),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/301/2017%20Special%20301%20Report%20FINAL.PDF
(“Serious challenges in China continue to confront U.S. intellectual property (IP) right
holders with respect to adequate and effective protection of IP, as well as fair and equitable
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such disputes have boiled over into the current trade war between
the United States and China,77 but there is also no question that
China’s intellectual property system has developed remarkably
rapidly and is continuing to do so.78
2. Intellectual property development in the United States
In contrast to the laws in China, intellectual property laws have
been a mainstay in the United States since the founding of the
republic. Patent, copyright, and trademark protection each had
significant histories in Britain and continental Europe prior to the
formation of the United States,79 and intellectual property
protection existed in various American colonies prior to the
American Revolution in 1776.80 The American Constitution grants
Congress the power to enact patent and copyright laws in the
Intellectual Property Clause of Article I.81 Congress wasted no time
in exercising this authority, passing the first patent act at
the beginning of its first term and the first copyright act the
following month.82
market access for U.S. persons that rely upon IP protection.”); USTR Announces Initiation of
Section 301 Investigation of China, OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/august/ustrannounces-initiation-section (announcing a United States Trade Representative
investigation of China’s intellectual property practices); Request for Consultations by the
United States, China—Certain Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights,
WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018) (United States WTO complaint against Chinese
intellectual property rights practices); Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting the Protection
and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS362/R (adopted Jan. 26,
2009) (United States complaint against Chinese intellectual property rights practices
under TRIPS).
77. Supra notes 6, 9.
78. Rana, supra note 1, at 126; Yu, Half-Century of Scholarship, supra note 19, at 1049–50,
1058–87.
79. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879); CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 97 (2006); Crane, supra note 6, at 98.
80. MAY & SELL, supra note 79, at 105; Edward C. Walterscheid, The Early Evolution
of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (5 Part I), 78 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
615 (1996).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“[The Congress shall have Power t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
82. Patent Act of Apr. 10, 1790, 1 Stat. 109 (“An Act to promote the progress of useful
Arts”); Copyright Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (“An Act for the encouragement of learning,
by securing the copies of maps, charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such
copies, during the times therein mentioned”).
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American states provided trademark protection under their
common law since the United States was formed,83 though the first
federal trademark law was not enacted until 1870.84 This law was
struck down by the Supreme Court as unsupported under the
Intellectual Property Clause,85 but Congress enacted a new
trademark act in 1881 pursuant to its Commerce Clause power, and
this law was upheld.86
These intellectual property laws have remained robust, and
generally robustly enforced (at least domestically), since their
inception.87 During the nineteenth century there was a period when
the United States was widely recognized as an international
intellectual property pirate.88 Subsequently, however, intellectual
property rights have been strongly enforced, and the dominant
strain of intellectual property discourse in the United States in the
twenty-first century has actually concerned whether it is too strong
and too strictly enforced.89
83. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:2 (5th ed. 2018); David S. Welkowitz,
Reexamining Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REV. 531, 532 (1991).
84. Act of July 8, 1870, 16 Stat. 198, 210–12 §§ 77–84 (“An Act to revise, consolidate, and
amend the Statutes relating to Patents and Copyrights”); MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3.
85. Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99; MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3.
86. Act of March 3, 1881, 21 Stat. 502 (“An act to authorize the registration of trademarks and protect the same”); MCCARTHY, supra note 83, at § 5:3.
87. DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN
SOLVE IT 21 (2009); Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese
Trademark Law, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 53, 72–73 (2008).
88. B. Zorina Khan & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, History Lessons: The Early Development of
Intellectual Property Institutions in the United States, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 233, 234–37 (2001);
Geoffrey R. Scott, A Comparative View of Copyright as Cultural Property in Japan and the United
States, 20 TEMP. INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. 283, 330 (2006); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, THE GROWTH OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF THE OWNERSHIP OF IDEAS IN THE UNITED STATES 11,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2020). The
United States did not join the Berne Convention, granting reciprocal copyright protection to
nationals of other signatories, until 1988. Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 315–18,
322–32 (2010); Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late Than Never: Implementation of the 1886 Berne
Convention, 22 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 171, 171–77 (1989). The United States and China are not
alone in shifting from weaker to stronger intellectual property systems as their countries
become more technologically advanced. Similar shifts have taken place in a number of other
countries. Mandel, supra note 7, at 764–65.
89. See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2009) (concluding that patent
protection should be weakened in certain regards based on an analysis indicating that
litigation costs exceed patent-associated profits in certain industries); BURK & LEMLEY,
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In contrast to Eastern cultures’ recognition of the contributions
of many across time, Western cultures tend to romanticize
individual authors and inventors as the sources of creative works
and inventions.90 Immanuel Kant developed the romantic concept
of an “author-genius,” an individual author whose work embodies
the author’s spirit and who creates something entirely new and
unprecedented.91 Scholars have analyzed how romantic notions of
authorship have worked their way into American copyright law,92
a result that is not surprising given that much American copyright
law developed as common law during the height of the romantic
period in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.93 Americans
likewise idolize the achievements of individual, iconic inventors,
such as Thomas Edison’s light bulb, Alexander Bell’s telephone,
Jonas Salk’s polio vaccine, and Steve Jobs’s Apple products.94 The
common conception of the “eureka” moment of invention,
achieved by a single researcher, remains a classic paradigm in the
West.95 In this cultural context, individualized, private intellectual
property rights find an easy home.
supra note 87, at 3 (discussing various critiques of the availability, strength, and breadth of
patent protection).
90. Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes Toward a Cultural Geography
of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996); Mandel, supra note 30, at 328; Rana, supra
note 1, at 118.
91. See generally IMMANUEL KANT, ESSAYS AND TREATISES ON MORAL, POLITICAL, AND
VARIOUS PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS (William Richardson ed. & trans., 1798); Martha
Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions of the Emergence of
the ‘Author,’ 17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 428–430 (1984) (discussing the development
of the idea of an individual, idealized ‘author’).
92. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 53–59 (1996); ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 284 (1998); Peter
Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 DUKE L.J. 455,
496–500.
93. BOYLE, supra note 92, at 53–59.
94. See Gregory Mandel, Thomas Edison’s Patent Application for the Incandescent Light
Bulb, in 2 MILESTONE DOCUMENTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 978, 979–80 (Paul Finkelman ed.,
2008); Elisabeth Crawford, Nobel: Always the Winners, Never the Losers, 282 SCIENCE 1256, 1257
(1998); Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the ‘Fuel of Interest’ from the ‘Fire of Genius’: Law and the
Employee-Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1160–61 (1998); Jessica Silbey, The
Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319 (2008).
95. Kevin Dunbar, How Scientists Build Models: InVivo Science as a Window on the
Scientific Method, in MODEL-BASED REASONING IN SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 85, 96 (Lorenzo
Magnani et al. eds., 1999); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA.
L. REV. 1575, 1583 (2003) (“The prototypical innovation contemplated by the patent law is
made by an individual inventor working in his garage after hours.”); Silbey, supra note 94,
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B.

Personal Property and Real Property Across Cultures

Like intellectual property rights, private rights in real property
in America arose with the earliest British colonies and have existed
consistently throughout the history of the United States.96 Private
property rights are a fundamental basis of the American capitalist
economy.97 Private ownership of real property provides incentives
for owners to invest in and develop their property.98 A common
utilitarian view of private property rights perceives that such rights
internalize the externalities of property use and consequently
incentivize the private owner to put the property to a more socially
beneficial use.99 In a similar vein and for similar reasons, private
ownership of personal property has been an unquestioned constant
throughout the United States’ history.100
Private rights in real and personal property have a more varied
history in China. For millennia, the emperor owned and had
absolute control over all property, both personal and real.101 When
the Republic of China was established in 1911, private property still
did not receive any protection.102 Although a 1930 Civil Code
included provisions concerning “Rights over Things,” this code

at 330. The image of a person yelling “Eureka!” upon a significant insight is traced to
Archimedes, who had been searching for a way to measure the volume of an irregular object
(in particular, a crown), getting into a bath and realizing that the volume of water displaced
by his body was equal to the amount of his body submerged. He was so excited about his
discovery that he ran through the streets shouting “Eureka” (Greek for “I have found it”).
DEAN KEITH SIMONTON, ORIGINS OF GENIUS: DARWINIAN PERSPECTIVES ON CREATIVITY
35 (1999).
96. David A. Thomas, Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared
History Part I: The Shared History, 34 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 143 (1999); David A. Thomas,
Anglo-American Land Law: Diverging Developments from a Shared History Part II: How AngloAmerican Land Law Diverged After American Colonization and Independence, 34 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 295 (1999).
97. MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 54 (David W. Pearce ed., 3d ed.
1986) (defining “Capitalism”); BRUCE R. SCOTT, THE CONCEPT OF CAPITALISM 66 (2009).
98. Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 348
(1967); Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Property Is Only Another Name for Monopoly, 9 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 51 (2017).
99. Demsetz, supra note 98, at 348, 356; Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The
Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1883 (2007).
100. Rana, supra note 1, at 121.
101. Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the
Protection of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 317, 319–20, 324 (2008).
102. Id. at 320.
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was never applied due to the Japanese occupation and war.103 The
Communist revolution in 1949 ushered in a new regime.104
Traditional Marxist doctrine prohibits private property ownership
as contrary to socialism.105 Under Mao, private property interests
were prohibited and all private property was seized and
transferred to state ownership.106 As Professor Mo Zhang writes,
“[d]uring this period, people were trained to follow the lead of the
proletariat (. . . the class of people with no assets or property)[,] . . .
ma[king] it impossible for Chinese citizens to make any claims of
property rights against the government[.]”107
Deng Xiaoping’s four modernizations in the late 1970s involved
a series of economic reforms and a shift towards more of a market
economy.108 Part of the transition included greater recognition of
private interests and personal liberty in general.109 This led to some
degree of informal notions of private property rights between
private parties, but the government did not formally acknowledge
tangible private property rights until it amended its constitution
in 2004.110 In 2007, China’s National People’s Congress passed the
first law explicitly permitting certain private property rights,
including rights over income and savings, housing, and a variety of
tangible items.111 Under this law, private parties still cannot own

103. Id.
104. COLUMBIA CHRONOLOGIES OF ASIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE 70 (John S. Bowman
ed., 2000); Richard Goldstein, Copyright Relations Between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China: An Interim Report, 10 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 403, 410 (1984); Sidel, supra
note 65, at 261.
105. HANS-HERMANN HOPPE, A THEORY OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM: ECONOMICS,
POLITICS AND ETHICS 2 (1989); Benjamin W. James, Expanding the Gap: How the Rural Property
System Exacerbates China’s Urban-Rural Gap, 20 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 451, 456 (2007).
106. THE WRITINGS OF MAO ZEDONG, 1949–1976: VOLUME I, SEPTEMBER 1949–DECEMBER
1955, at 351 (Michael Y. M. Kau & John K Leung eds., 1986); Daniel J. Morrissey, Managing
the Wealth of Nations: What China and America May Have to Teach Each Other About Corporate
Governance, 68 SMU L. REV. 831, 833 (2015); William D. Soileau, Past is Present: Urban Real
Property Rights and Housing Reform in the People’s Republic of China, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J.
299 (1995); Zhang, supra note 101, at 324–26.
107. Zhang, supra note 101, at 320–21.
108. COLUMBIA CHRONOLOGIES OF ASIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE, supra note 104;
Soileau, supra note 106.
109. Soileau, supra note 106; Zhang, supra note 101, at 323.
110. Zhang, supra note 101, at 336.
111. Ryan van Steenis, From Mao to Madison and Back: An Examination of China’s National
Property Law and Its Diminished Potential, 23 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 35 (2009); Zhang, supra
note 101, at 336–37.
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real property, which is owned by the state or other public entities.112
Private parties can own the right to use certain real property, as
well as own any buildings on the land, while renting the land on
long-term leases lasting up to seventy years.113 The law also
includes protection for private owners against illegal seizures by
the government.114 The evolution of private property rights in
China was based on a desire to stimulate “people’s initiative to
create and accumulate wealth and to promote social harmony” in
an effort to drive the economy.115 As with intellectual property
rights, China’s shift towards granting private protection for
personal and real property rights was based on a desire to
incentivize investment and development. China is currently
working on a comprehensive civil code, one that is anticipated to
further strengthen private property rights.116
Given the differing histories of intellectual, personal, and real
property rights in China and the United States, it is not surprising
that people in these two countries have differing conceptions of
property rights. The following section details current
understanding around these differences.
C.

Psychological Conceptions of Property

A variety of psychological research has explored the cultural
differences between Americans and Chinese.117 Prior research in
social and cultural psychology has found differences in how East
Asians versus Americans and Europeans tend to view
112. Zhang, supra note 101, at 355. In China, real property in urban areas is owned by
the state and real property in rural areas is owned by collectives. Id.
113. Id. at 355–56. For residential buildings, this term may be automatically renewed.
Id. at 356.
114. Property Law of the People’s Republic of China, Order No. 62, Art. 42
(Mar. 16, 2007), http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/
content_21897791.htm; Zhang, supra note 101, at 359 (describing the provisions for
compensation in the case of expropriation, though noting that the law does not guarantee
due process in relation to takings).
115. Jim Yardley, China Nears Passage of Landmark Property Law, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/business/09yuan.html.
116. Javier C. Hernandez & Owen Guo, China Pushes Legal Overhaul That Would Bolster
State Power, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/world/
asia/xi-jinping-legal-overhaul.html.
117. Chen, supra note 12, at 84–91; Chia et al., supra note 12, at 23–30;
Ji et al., supra note 12, at 943–55; Morris et al., supra note 12, at 949–71; Stipek, supra note 12,
at 616–29.
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themselves.118 For example, East Asians have been found to have a
more collectivist self-construal, viewing the self in terms of one’s
relation to others, and holding what is considered an
interdependent view of the self, in which people value their social
group’s or family’s goals, needs, and abilities.119 In contrast, North
Americans and Europeans have been found to be more
individualistic, viewing the self as separate from others, and
holding what is considered to be a more independent view of the
self, emphasizing one’s own distinct goals, needs, and abilities.120
Most relevant to the present work, a meta-analysis of numerous
studies found that Chinese adults are more collectivistic and
American adults are more individualistic.121
These apparent cultural differences are likely interwoven with
the distinct histories of property rights in China and America. That
is, cultural differences may have led to some of the differences in
each culture’s treatment of personal property, real property, and
intellectual property, and the differing historical paths
simultaneously may also produce differing cultural and social
attitudes towards property rights today.
Despite rich debates over the last several decades concerning
differences between American and Chinese attitudes towards
intellectual property rights, and despite the critical effects that such
attitudes can have on intellectual property compliance and
economic markets, to our knowledge no one has ever actually tried
to test these attitudes. The studies reported here provide the first
attempts to explore cross-cultural differences in attitudes towards
intellectual property rights, personal property rights, and real
property rights between Americans and Chinese. The somewhat
counterintuitive results provide important lessons for the future
of international intellectual property rights enforcement
and discourse.

118. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Oyserman et al., supra note 13, at 255–79;
Triandis, supra note 13, at 907–24.
119. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Daphna Oyserman, Heather M. Coon &
Markus Kemmelmeier, Rethinking Individualism and Collectivism: Evaluation of Theoretical
Assumptions and Meta-Analyses, 128 PSYCH. BULL. 3, 3–72 (2002).
120. Markus et al., supra note 13, at 223–53; Oyserman et al., supra note 119.
121. Oyserman et al., supra note 119. This meta-analysis analyzed 83 total studies,
nine of which directly compared the United States and China (not counting Taiwan and
Hong Kong). Id.
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II.

EXPERIMENTS ON CROSS-CULTURAL PERCEPTIONS OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS

As the above historical accounts reveal, the formal laws on the
books do not necessarily translate into how law will be
implemented in society. Rather, the enforcement and effectuation
of law is subject to the political and social culture surrounding the
formal law.122 In order to better comprehend how legal rules play
out in practice, it is necessary to understand the social and
intellectual environment in which the rules exist. The studies
presented below examine the relation between law and culture in
the United States and China for different types of property rights.
Study 1 provides a pilot examination and Study 2 presents the
primary examination that is the basis for the analysis in Part III.
A.

Study 1: Cross-Cultural Study of American College Students

Our first examination of cross-cultural perceptions of property
rights was conducted by comparing college students from different
cultural backgrounds. As in all of the studies reported here, we
selected adult students who were not engaged in the study of law.
In order to explore cross-cultural attitudes, we recruited White
American, East Asian American, and East Asian International
college students. White American and East Asian American
participants were adults born in the United States who had
not lived outside of the United States. East Asian participants
were adults born in an East Asian country who arrived in the
United States at sixteen years of age or older.123 These criteria were
determined before the study began.

122. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 628 (1986) (discussing sociological research finding
that, because laws are costly to learn and enforce, parties often ignore the formal law and
instead create their own systems of informal norms and enforcement that work within their
relationships and context).
123. In an effort to attract a sufficient population size, as well as other reasons, it was
more practical to select East Asian participants generally as opposed to limiting Study 1
to Chinese students. As discussed below, Study 2 contains a cohort of solely
Chinese participants.
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1. Study 1 methodology
Participants. Participants were college students recruited at a
large university in the Pacific Northwest through the university’s
online participant pool system that compensated participants
with course credit for completing an online survey. The final
sample included sixty White Americans, seventy-seven East Asian
Americans, and sixty-one East Asians.124 The median ages
and gender distribution of the three populations were similar.125
The study materials included (1) vignette evaluations, (2) legal
compliance questions, (3) a self-construal scale, and (4)
demographic questions.126 Each of these sections is
described below.
Vignette evaluations. Participants received twelve vignettes
reflecting a 4 (property domain) X 3 (transfer type) design. The four
property domains were: (1) intellectual property protected by a
patent (copying of a patented vaccine), (2) intellectual property
protected by a copyright (copying of a copyrighted textbook), (3)
personal property (taking a textbook), and (4) real property
(trespassing on land). The three property transfer types were: (1)
someone taking another person’s private property for his/her own
benefit (private-for-private), (2) someone taking another person’s
private property for a public use benefiting third parties
(private-for-public), and (3) a public entity taking private property
for a public use benefiting third parties (public-for-public).
Following each vignette, participants were asked their “opinion
about whether such action should or should not be allowed,
regardless of what the law might actually be.” Specifically,
participants were asked, “In your opinion, should [the property
user’s] action be legally allowed?” (legal permissibility). Participants
124. An additional 30 American participants completed the study, but were excluded
from analyses either for not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 15), not being born in the
United States (n = 2), or having lived outside of the United States for a significant period of
time (n = 13). An additional 41 East Asian participants completed the study but were
excluded from analyses either for not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 1) or arriving in
the United States before 16 years of age (n = 40).
125. White Americans: median age = 19.13 years, SD = 1.74 years; 55% female. East
Asian Americans: median age = 19.38 years, SD = 1.64 years; 54% female. East Asians:
median age = 20.23 years, SD = 3.32 years; 61% female.
126. The online survey also included two short questions that are not included here, as
they were pilot items for a future study examining perceptions of eminent domain. These
questions were the very last items presented to participants.
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reported their answers to each question using a slider scale ranging
from 0 (definitely not allowed) to 100 (definitely allowed), which
was anchored at 50 when the item was presented to participants.
After this question, participants were asked, “Laws should be most
concerned with the rights of: [intellectual] property owners vs.
[intellectual] property users” (protection of rights). Participants again
reported their answers on a slider scale ranging from 0 (owners) to
100 (users) that was anchored at 50 when presented to participants.
Legal compliance questions. Participants were next asked to
answer two questions about their general level of support for
property laws: (1) “How important is it for people to comply with
property rights?” and (2) “How important is it for people to comply
with intellectual property rights?” Participants responded to these
questions using a slider scale ranging from 0 (extremely not
important) to 100 (extremely important), which was anchored at 50
when the item was presented to participants. Because participants’
scores on the two opinion questions were highly correlated to one
another,127 we created a new factor to represent a construct we call
Compliance Support, which is the average of scores on these two
items. Higher Compliance Support scores indicate greater support
for the compliance with property rights.
Self-Construal Scale. To measure participants’ independent and
interdependent self-construals (typically associated with Western
and East Asian cultures, respectively), participants completed the
Self-Construal Scale.128 This thirty-item scale includes a fifteen-item
scale referring to an independent self-construal (e.g., “I enjoy being
unique and different from others in many respects”) and a fifteenitem scale referring to an interdependent self-construal (e.g., “Even
when I strongly disagree with group members, I avoid an
argument”). Participants were able to provide a response ranging
from “strongly disagree” (1) to “strongly agree” (7). Critically,
participants received separate scores for interdependent selfconstrual129 and independent self-construal,130 as they were
127. r = .67, p < .001.
128. Theodore M. Singelis, The Measurement of Independent and Interdependent SelfConstruals, 20 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 580 (1994).
129. White Americans: Cronbach’s alpha = .70; East Asian Americans: Cronbach’s
alpha = .79; East Asian: Cronbach’s alpha = .83.
130. White Americans: Cronbach’s alpha = .66; East Asian Americans: Cronbach’s
alpha = .75; East Asian: Cronbach’s alpha = .72.
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designed to be separate constructs, each reflecting the average score
of the fifteen pertinent items.
Demographic questions. The demographic section of the survey
included questions about participants’ age, gender, race/ethnicity,
birthplace, age upon arrival in the United States, residence outside
of the United States, political ideology, type of residence, and
previous experience with law or law-related fields. For the lawrelated experience items, participants were asked whether they
themselves had “any current or past experience with law or lawrelated fields (i.e., taken law classes or worked as a law clerk)” and
whether they had “any close friends or family working in law or
law-related fields[.]” Demographics by participant group are
reported in Table 1.
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Table 1. Demographics of Participants in Study 1.
Variable

Asian
American
M = 19.38 (1.64)

East Asian

Age (in years)

White
American
M = 19.13 (1.74)

Gender
Male
Female
Other

45%
55%
0%

46%
53%
1%

39%
61%
0%

Residence
Urban
Suburban
Small Town
Rural

44%
45%
8%
3%

27%
65%
4%
4%

82%
15%
3%
0%

Political
Ideology

M = 34.60
(26.76)

M = 33.06
(18.96)

M = 48.95
(18.66)

Own Law
Experience
Yes
No

12%
88%

8%
92%

7%
93%

M = 20.23 (3.32)

Family Law
Experience
12%
Yes
28%
18%
88%
No
72%
82%
Note: Political ideology was scored on a scale from 0
(liberal/left) to 100 (conservative/right).
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2. Study 1 results
Responses to the legal permissibility and protection of rights
vignette items were analyzed in two 4 (property domain: patent vs.
copyright vs. personal vs. land) x 3 (transfer type: private-forprivate vs. private-for-public vs. public-for-public) x 3 (group:
White American vs. East Asian American vs. East Asian) mixed
measures ANOVAs131 with group as a between-subjects factor and
domain and transfer type as within-subjects factors. The discussion
below provides a detailed statistical report of the results. The
implications of the results of both Study 1 and Study 2 are discussed
in Part III.
Analyses of the legal permissibility items revealed statistically
significant variation across the different property domains.132
Participants believed that using someone else’s personal property
(M = 20.54, SD = 18.32) should be less permissible than using
someone else’s intellectual property (patent: M = 32.70, SD = 20.68;
copyright: M = 34.66, SD = 20.53) or land (M = 34.15, SD = 24.31).133
The responses to the patent, copyright, and land scenarios,
however, did not vary from one another (all ps = 1.0).
The type of transfer also had a significant effect on respondents’
property rights evaluations.134 Participants believed that privatefor-private uses of property (M = 18.10, SD = 14.88) should be less
allowed than private-for-public uses of property (M = 35.12, SD =
21.86), or public-for-public uses of property (M = 38.32, SD =
21.37).135 Further, participants believed that private-for-public uses
of property should be less allowed than public-for-public uses of
property (p = .022). However, whether a respondent was White
American, East Asian American, or East Asian had no significant
effect on their evaluation of legal permissibility (p = .405).

131. The analysis of variance (ANOVA) is a statistic designed to isolate and
evaluate the effect of independent variables on a continuous dependent variable.
PAUL G. HOEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS 311–12 (5th ed. 1984); J. RICK
TURNER & JULIAN THAYER, INTRODUCTION TO ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE: DESIGN, ANALYSIS &
INTERPRETATION (2001).
132. F(3,462) = 33.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .18.
133. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): using personal property should be
less permissible than using intellectual property, ps < .001, or land, p < .001.
134. F(2,308) = 131.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .46.
135. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): private-for-private uses should be
less allowed than private-for-public uses, p < .001, or public-for-public uses, p < .001.
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The effects identified above were qualified by a significant
interaction between the property domain and transfer type at
issue.136 The differentiation based on transfer type existed for three
of the four property domains—in the patent, copyright, and
personal property scenarios, participants were more strict about
private-for-private transfers compared with private-for-public
transfers (all ps < .001), and more strict about private-for-private
transfers compared with public-for-public transfer (all ps < .001),
but judged private-for-public and public-for-public transfers as
similar (all ps = 1.0). This pattern did not hold for the land scenarios,
as participants judged all three transfer types similarly
(all ps > .083).
There was also a significant interaction between race/ethnicity
and transfer type.137 The effect of transfer type noted above held
within two of the three groups—in the White American and East
Asian groups, participants were more strict about private-forprivate transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps <
.001), and more strict about private-for-private transfers compared
to public-for-public transfers (all ps < .001), but judged private-forpublic and public-for-public transfers as similar (all ps > .899).
However, this pattern did not hold for the East Asian Americans,
as participants not only were more strict about private-for-private
transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (p < .001), and
more strict about private-for-private transfers compared to publicfor-public transfers (p < .001), but also were more strict about
private-for-public transfers compared to public-for-public transfers
(p = .011). No other interactions were significant (all ps > .336). The
results of the legal permissibility questions are displayed in Figure 1
and Table 2.

136. F(6,924) = 32.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .17.
137. F(4,308) = 2.96, p = .020, ηp2 = .04.
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Figure 1. Study 1: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer
Type, Domain, and Group. Higher values represent greater legal
permissibility.
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Table 2. Study 1: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer
Type, Domain, and Group. Higher values represent greater legal
permissibility.
White American
Patent

Copyright

Personal

Land

Private for Private

9.35

9.8

6.98

33.14

Private for Public

41.96

40.71

25.37

30.37

Public for Public

40.55

43.76

25.12

37.51

Asian American
Patent

Copyright

Personal

Land

Private for Private

13.67

13.95

9.93

36.2

Private for Public

44.03

49.17

24.7

31.67

Public for Public

46.95

52.73

28.63

43.48

East Asian
Patent

Copyright

Personal

Land

Private for Private

18.46

21.41

12.48

31.83

Private for Public

37.87

39.2

26.89

29.5

Public for Public

41.5

41.17

24.78

33.63

Similar to the legal permissibility responses, analyses of the
protection of rights vignettes also revealed a statistically significant
effect of property domain on participants’ responses.138 Participants
were more likely to believe that laws should be more concerned
with protecting the rights of property owners relative to property
users in the case of personal property (M = 26.32, SD = 27.31) as
138. F(3,420) = 8.99, p < .001, ηp2 = .06.
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compared to both forms of intellectual property tested (patent: M =
34.53, SD = 30.13; copyright: M = 35.07, SD = 29.24), and as
compared to land (M = 32.04, SD = 26.46).139 Responses to the
two intellectual property cases and land again did not differ
(all ps > .808).
Transfer type also had a significant effect on protection of rights
evaluations.140 Respondents were more likely to believe that laws
should be more concerned with protecting the rights of property
owners in private-for-private uses of property (M = 23.64, SD =
26.84) compared to both the private-for-public uses of property (M
= 36.20, SD = 28.73), and the public-for-public uses of property (M
= 36.14, SD = 29.29).141 Responses to the private-for-public uses of
property and public-for-public uses of property did not differ (p =
1.0). As with the legal permissibility questions, there was no
significant effect of participants’ race/ethnicity on their responses
(p = .284).
These protection of rights effects were qualified by a significant
interaction between the property domain and transfer type.142 This
interaction revealed that the main effect of transfer type held within
three of the four domains. In the patent, copyright, and personal
property scenarios, participants were more likely to believe that the
law should be concerned with the rights of the owner in privatefor-private transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps
< .001), as well as more likely to be concerned with rights of the
owner in private-for-private transfers compared to public-forpublic transfers (all ps < .001), but judged private-for-public and
public-for-public transfers as similar (all ps = 1.0). However, this
pattern did not hold for the land scenarios, where participants
judged all three transfer types similarly (all ps > .425).
There was also a significant interaction between participants’
race/ethnicity and property domain responses, revealing that the
main effect of domain occurred in the White American group, but
139. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): laws should protect the rights of
property owners relative to property users in the case of personal property compared to both
forms of intellectual property, ps < .001, and land, p = .025.
140. F(2,280) = 37.73, p < .001, ηp2 = .037.
141. Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni corrected): laws should be more concerned with
protecting the rights of property owners in private-for-private uses of property compared to
both the private-for-public uses of property, p < .001, and the public-for-public uses of
property, p < .001.
142. F(6,840) = 13.32, p < .001, ηp2 = .087.
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not the other two groups.143 White American participants were
more likely to believe that laws should be more concerned with
protecting the rights of property owners in the case of personal
property compared to both forms of intellectual property and land
(all ps < .001), with the intellectual property and land domains
being judged similarly (all ps = 1.0). East Asian American
participants, on the other hand, were (marginally) more likely to
believe that laws should be more concerned with protecting the
rights of property owners in both the personal property and land
domains compared to both intellectual property domains (all ps <
.065). In this group, the personal property and land domains were
judged similarly to one another (p = 1.0), and the two intellectual
property domains were judged similarly to one another (p = 1.0).
Further, the East Asian participants judged all four domains
similarly with respect to whether the law should be concerned with
rights of property owners or property users (all ps > .160). No other
interactions were significant (all ps > .317).
Turning to the questions about the importance of complying
with laws, the three groups (White American, East Asian American,
and East Asian) differed significantly in the degree to which they
endorsed compliance with property and intellectual property
laws.144 East Asian participants’ Compliance Support (M = 83.59,
SD = 14.91) was significantly higher than that of both East Asian
Americans (M = 75.45, SD = 16.75) and White Americans (M =
75.90, SD = 19.23).145 The Compliance Support of East Asian
American and White American participants did not differ
significantly (p = .988). Each of the race/ethnicity groups scored
significantly above the midpoint of the scale (50), indicating a
tendency to prefer compliance with property and intellectual
property law.146
The three race/ethnicity groups differed significantly on their
tendency to endorse independent self-construal147 but not on their

143. F(3,420) = 2.72, p = .013, ηp2 = .037.
144. F(2,186) = 4.39, p = .014, ηp2 = .05, one-way ANOVA.
145. Posthoc Tukey tests: East Asian participants’ Compliance Support was
significantly higher than that of East Asian American participants (p = .019) and White
Americans (p = .043).
146. White American: t(57) = 17.15, p < .001; East Asian American: t(73) = 13.07, p < .001;
East Asian: t(56) = 10.17, p < .001.
147. F(2,193) = 6.63, p = .002, ηp2 = .06.
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tendency to endorse interdependent self-construal.148 White
American participants (M = 4.90, SD = 0.57) had significantly
higher independent self-construal than East Asian participants (M
= 4.51, SD = 0.59; p = .001), but were no different than East Asian
American participants (M = 4.69, SD = 0.59; p = .103). East Asian
and East Asian American participants did not differ in their
tendency to endorse independent self-construal (p = .174).
Having completed Study 1 as a pilot study on cross-cultural
attitudes towards property rights, we turned to Study 2.
B.

Study 2: Cross-Cultural Study of American
and Chinese College Students

Study 1 yields several tantalizing results concerning differences
in attitudes towards property across cultures. Because Study 1
recruited only students at an American university, however, there
is a significant chance that selection effects affected the East Asian
participant population. That is, students from East Asian countries
who attend college in the United States, even though they grew up
in East Asia, may not be reflective of East Asian attitudes towards
property rights in general. For Study 2, we turned to a comparison
of college students at an American university and at a Chinese
university. As in Study 1, none of the participants were engaged in
the study of law.
1. Study 2 methodology
Participants. Our final group of participants included 101 White
American college students from a university in the Pacific
Northwest (who had not participated in Study 1) and 102 Chinese
college students from a university in the Yunnan region of China.149
The gender distribution of the study populations was similar, and
the Chinese participants averaged slightly older than the
Americans.150 White American participants were recruited both

148. F(2,192) = 1.56, p = .213, ηp2 = .02.
149. Yunnan is a large province in southern China, known for its diverse population,
and is significantly less economically developed than Beijing or Shanghai. Ping-chia Kuo &
Robert Lee Suettinger, Yunnan, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (Nov. 8, 2016), https://
www.britannica.com/place/Yunnan.
150. White American college students: Mage = 20.12 years, SD = 3.43 years; 67% female.
Chinese college students: Mage = 23.42 years, SD = 5.57 years; 66% female.
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through a university online participant pool system that
compensated participants with course credit and through postings
around campus that compensated participants with a $5 gift card
for completing an online survey. Chinese participants were
recruited through an announcement during their university
courses, in which they were invited to visit a survey platform
(Sojump.com) to complete the survey online. Upon completion of
the survey, participants were compensated with 20 Yuan, which
was determined by professors familiar with American and Chinese
college students to provide a roughly similar incentive to the
$5 gift card.151
To be included in the analyses, White American participants
had to be born in the United States and to not have lived outside of
the United States for a significant time. Chinese students had to be
born in China and to not have lived outside of China for a
significant time. All participants were required to be at least
eighteen years of age and no older than forty years of age.152
Both the United States and China have rich cultural, ethnic, and
racial variation within the societies. Our study, focused on White
American college students and on Chinese college students from a
single region in order to provide a comparison, does not explore
this intracountry diversity, a topic that is worthy of further
research. Nevertheless, we use the general terms “American” and
“Chinese” in the text that follows for ease of discussion.
As in Study 1, the study materials included (1) vignette
evaluations, (2) legal compliance questions, (3) a self-construal
scale, and (4) demographic questions. The survey material for the
American participants was written in English, and the survey
material for Chinese participants was written in Mandarin Chinese.
The survey materials were translated from English by a native
Mandarin speaker and were then back-translated to English by
different bilingual translators in order to confirm the translation.
Vignette evaluations. The vignettes were the same as those used
in Study 1, with the exception of the three vignettes depicting use
151. 20 Yuan was worth roughly $3.00 at the time of the study.
152. An additional 19 participants completed the study in the United States but were
excluded from analyses for either not being the target race/ethnicity (n = 5) or having lived
outside of the United States (n = 14). An additional 28 participants completed the study as
part of the Chinese group but were excluded from analyses for either not being born in China
(n = 8), having lived outside of China (n = 9), or being outside of the target ages (n = 11).
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of someone’s real property. The land vignettes were modified to be
about taking someone else’s land, rather than trespassing on land
(as they were in Study 1). This change was made in order to better
align the real property scenario with the intellectual property and
personal property scenarios, as we were concerned that a single
trespass on real property, causing no damage, might not have been
a significant enough incursion on property rights relative to the
other vignettes. None of the vignettes provide for compensation for
the taken property rights.
As in Study 1, participants read twelve total vignettes (that is,
for each of the four property domains, vignettes involving a
private-for-private transfer, a private-for-public transfer, and a
public-for-public transfer). Following each vignette, participants
were asked, “In your opinion, should the property user’s action be
legally allowed?” Participants reported their answers to each
question using a slider scale ranging from 0 (definitely not allowed)
to 100 (definitely allowed), which was anchored at 50 when the item
was presented to participants. Participants were not asked the
second dependent variable question from Study 1 (concerning
whether the law should be primarily concerned with the rights of
[intellectual] property owners or users), because the responses in
Study 1 were largely redundant, and removing the question
addressed concerns about time limits in this study.
Legal compliance questions. The legal compliance questions from
Study 1 were slightly modified, such that participants were asked
three questions: (1) “How important is it for people to comply with
property rights in land?,” (2) “How important is it for people to
comply with personal property rights (such as peoples’ clothes or
books)?,” and (3) “How important is it for people to comply with
intellectual property rights?” Participants responded to the
questions using a slider scale ranging from 0 (extremely not
important) to 100 (extremely important), which was anchored at 50
when the item was presented to participants. Because participants’
scores on the three opinion questions were highly correlated to one
another,153 we created a new factor to represent a construct we call
Compliance Support, which is the average of scores on these three
items. Higher Compliance Support scores indicate greater support
for the compliance with property rights.
153. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .76; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .93.
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Self-Construal Scale. As in Study 1, participants completed the
Self-Construal Scale.154 Again, both the independent155 and
interdependent156 scales showed high reliability among the items
within each scale. Therefore, the fifteen items on each scale were
averaged to create an Independent Self-Construal score and an
Interdependent Self-Construal score for each participant.
Demographic questions. The demographic section of the survey
included questions about participant age, gender, race/ethnicity,
birthplace, age upon arrival in the United States/China, residence
outside of the United States/China, academic major, year at
university, and experience with law. For the law-related experience
item, participants were asked whether they had “any current or
past experience with law or law-related fields (i.e., taken law classes
or worked as a law clerk).” Responses are provided in Table 3.

154. Singelis, supra note 128, at 580.
155. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .73; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .87.
156. American: Cronbach’s alpha = .69; Chinese: Cronbach’s alpha = .91.
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Table 3. Demographics of Participants in Study 2.
Variable

American

Chinese

Age (in years)

M = 20.12 (3.43)

M = 23.42 (5.58)

Gender
Male
Female
Other
Do not wish to report

32%
66%
1%
1%

34%
66%
0%
0%

Academic Major
Psychology
Business
Other Social Science
Natural Science
Humanities
Other
More than one

6%
24%
15%
16%
13%
18%
8%

15%
26%
7%
5%
15%
23%
9%

Year at University
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth

40%
23%
23%
13%
1%

11%
38%
16%
12%
23%

Law Experience
Yes
No

25%
75%

40%
60%
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Study 2 results

Responses to all of the vignette items were analyzed in a 4
(property domain: patent vs. copyright vs. personal property vs.
real property) x 3 (transfer type: private-for-private vs. private-forpublic vs. public-for-public) x 2 (group: American vs. Chinese)
mixed measures ANOVA with group as a between-subjects factor
and domain and transfer type as within-subjects factors. All
pairwise comparisons are Bonferroni corrected.157
As in Study 1, analyses revealed that there was a statistically
significant effect of the property domain on participant
responses.158 Participants believed that using someone else’s
personal property (M = 27.41, SD = 28.50) should be less
permissible than using someone else’s intellectual property (patent:
M = 38.22, SD = 32.99; copyright: M = 36.89, SD = 41.05; ps < .001)
or real property (M = 34.74, SD = 31.43; p < .001). Responses for the
two types of intellectual property and the real property cases did
not differ from each other (all ps > .387).
Analyses again revealed a significant effect of transfer type on
vignette evaluations as well.159 The study respondents believed that
private-for-private uses of property (M = 21.73, SD = 27.59) should
be less allowed than private-for-public uses of property (M = 39.36,
SD = 32.73; p < .001), or public-for-public uses of property (M =
41.85, SD = 33.21; p < .001). Further, participants believed that
private-for-public uses of property should be less allowed than
public-for-public uses of property (p = .014).
Contrary to Study 1, there was a significant effect of
participants’ race/ethnicity on their property scenario
evaluations.160 American participants (M = 28.36, SD = 26.23) were
significantly more likely to say that the takings of property should
not be allowed compared to Chinese participants (M = 40.27,
SD = 32.80).
157. The Bonferroni correction is a commonly used statistical tool applied when several
statistical tests are performed simultaneously on a single data set. REBECCA M. WARNER,
APPLIED STATISTICS: FROM BIVARIATE THROUGH MULTIVARIATE TECHNIQUES 98 (2d ed. 2013);
see D. James Greiner et al., The Limits of Unbundled Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a
Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 985 n.253 (2013)
(noting the commonality of the Bonferroni correction).
158. F(3,603) = 20.19, p < .001, ηp2 = .09.
159. F(2,402) = 143.24, p < .001, ηp2 = .42.
160. F(1,201) = 12.62, p < .001, ηp2 = .06.

259

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2020

The effects of property domain and transfer type described
above were qualified by a significant interaction between them.161
In each of the property domains, participants were more strict
about the private-for-private transfers (M = 21.78, SD = 27.62)
compared to the private-for-public transfers (M = 39.38, SD = 26.74)
and the public-for-public transfers (M = 41.87, SD = 26.47; all ps <
.001). However, while respondents were marginally more strict
about the private-for-public transfers compared to the public-forpublic transfers in the copyright domain (p = .059), they evaluated
the private-for-public and public-for-public transfers similarly in
the patent (p = .175), personal property (p = 1.0), and real property
(p = 1.0) domains. In addition, after plotting the results and seeing
what appeared to be a difference across culture in the private-forprivate items, we explored whether Chinese and American
participants differed in means for each type of transfer.162 We found
that American participants (M = 11.17) were substantially more
strict about private-for-private transfers than Chinese participants
(M = 32.38),163 and American participants (M = 35.47) were also
significantly more strict about private-for-public transfers than
Chinese participants (M = 43.26).164 In contrast, the difference
between American (M = 38.45) and Chinese participants (M = 45.26)
for public-for-public transfers was not significant (p = .067).
There was also a significant interaction between race/ethnicity
and transfer type.165 This interaction revealed that both Chinese and
Americans were more strict about the private-for-private transfers
compared to the private-for-public transfers (all ps < .001), and the
public-for-public transfers (all ps < .001). However, while the
Chinese participants evaluated the private-for-public and publicfor-public scenarios as similar (p = .311), in contrast to Study 1,
American participants were more strict about the private-for-public
compared to the public-for-public scenarios (p = .049).
Unlike Study 1, there was a significant interaction between
race/ethnicity and property domain.166 This relationship revealed
that the main effect of property domain—that participants were
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
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F(6,1206) = 3.88, p = .001, ηp2 = .019.
These results may be taken with caution because they are post hoc.
t(201) = 5.88, p < .001, d = .83.
t(201) = 2.09, p = .038, d = .29.
F(2,402) = 19.98, p < .001, ηp2 = .09.
F(3,603) = 7.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .04.
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more strict about the use of personal property than intellectual or
real property—was stronger among American participants than
among Chinese participants. American participants were
significantly more likely to say taking property should not be
allowed in the personal property domain compared to the
intellectual property and land domains (ps < .001). Further, the
American participants were more strict about the land domain
compared to the copyright domain (p = .039); however, they were
no more strict about land than about patent (p = .140), and
evaluated copyright and patent statistically similarly (p = 1.0). On
the other hand, Chinese participants were only significantly more
strict about the personal property domain compared to the patent
domain (p = .006). Aside from the aforementioned finding, and a
marginally significant difference in participants’ responses to the
personal property and land domains (p = .067), Chinese
participants did not evaluate the four domains differentially
(all ps > .474).
Finally, these interactions were further qualified by a significant
three-way interaction between race/ethnicity, transfer type, and
property domain, suggesting some differences between cultures
with respect to how domain and transfer type interact.167 The threeway interaction revealed that American and Chinese participants
show a similar pattern in response to the three transfer types in the
patent, personal property, and land domains, such that in all three
domains participants were more strict about private-for-private
transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (all ps < .026),
and compared to public-for-public transfers (all ps < .002), but
evaluated the private-for-public and public-for-public transfers
similarly (all ps > .415). The pattern of responses from American
and Chinese groups differed slightly for the copyright domain. In
the copyright domain, both groups were stricter about private-forprivate transfers compared to private-for-public transfers (ps <
.001) and compared to public-for-public transfers (ps < .001).
However, while Americans were more strict about private-forpublic transfers relative to public-for-public transfers (p = .024),
Chinese participants evaluated these two scenarios similarly (p =
1.0). The results of the Study 2 vignette evaluations are displayed
in Figure 2.
167. F(6,1206) = 4.54, p < .001, ηp2 = .02.
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Figure 2. Study 2: Legal Permissibility Ratings of Vignettes by Transfer
Type, Domain, and Group.

Chinese
Private for Public

Public for Public
In contrast to the East Asian and White American groups in
Study 1 who differed on the legal compliance questions, Chinese
and American participants in Study 2 did not differ in their
responses on the legal compliance questions.168 Both American (M
= 82.14, SD = 15.68) and Chinese (M = 78.22, SD = 26.78) participant
Compliance Support scores averaged significantly above the
midpoint (50), indicating a desire for compliance with property and
intellectual property law.169
On the self-construal scale, consistent with Study 1, the two
groups differed significantly in their tendency to endorse
independent self-construal,170 such that American participants
reported higher independent self-construal (M = 4.75, SD = 0.63)
than Chinese participants (M = 4.06, SD = 0.76). Unlike the groups
in Study 1, the Study 2 groups also differed significantly in their
tendency to endorse interdependent self-construal,171 such that
168.
169.
170.
171.
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t(201) = 1.27, p = .204.
American: t(100) = 20.59, p < .001; Chinese: t(101) = 10.64, p < .001.
t(201) = 6.98, p < .001, d = .99.
t(201) = 7.40, p < .001, d = 1.25.
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American participants (somewhat counterintuitively) reported
higher interdependent self-construal (M = 4.90, SD = 0.54) than
Chinese participants (M = 4.21, SD = 0.78). The results of the studies
are discussed in Part III.
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING CULTURE, PROPERTY,
AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EXCEPTIONALISM
For decades, the common perception across much of the
Western world has been that Chinese do not respect intellectual
property rights.172 This critique is based on the perception that
Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights are in some
way exceptional, different from what they should be and different
from other people’s attitudes towards intellectual property rights.
The results of our experiments indicate that these attributions may
be accurate in some respects, but not in others. The results strongly
suggest that both American and Chinese attitudes towards
intellectual property rights are more complex than previously
realized. Our studies also indicate that perhaps we should be
exploring a different exceptionalism question: Why do Americans
differentiate their preferences for intellectual property rights so
starkly from their preferences for other property rights?
As with all experimental work, the conclusions we draw from
our results are limited by the representativeness of the samples.
Our participants were college students, drawn from a single
campus in the United States and a single campus in China. These
samples may not be representative of the cultures at large. It is
possible that American and Chinese college students are more
culturally aligned with each other than American and Chinese
populations in general, due to sharing an age cohort, the
globalization of information and some aspects of culture, or other
factors. The discussion below assumes that the American and
Chinese populations that we sampled are at least somewhat
representative of American and Chinese populations at large.
A.

American Preferences for Stronger Property Rights Are Contextual

The survey experiments provide varied results concerning
whether Americans tend to prefer stronger property rights than
172. See supra Part I.
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Chinese. On the one hand, there was no statistically significant
difference in American and Chinese responses to the general
questions on whether it was important to comply with real
property rights, personal property rights, and intellectual property
rights. On the other hand, Americans indicated stronger property
rights preferences in the vignette responses overall.
One possible explanation for these seemingly inconsistent
outcomes is that the variation may result from differences in the
issues that people from each culture default to conceptually when
asked about property rights without context. When queried in the
abstract about support for property rights, there is substantial
consistency across the cultures. When subjects are asked about
specific scenarios, however, their responses and the consistency
across cultures is more nuanced.
In the vignettes, Americans tended to demonstrate a preference
for stronger property rights than the Chinese. Chinese participants’
permissibility ratings averaged higher than Americans’ for each
type of property and for each type of transfer.173 Examining the
twelve vignettes individually, Chinese permissibility ratings
significantly exceeded American permissibility ratings in eight of
the vignettes and were statistically equivalent in the other four.174
The American preference for stronger property rights than
those preferred by Chinese appeared across all private-for-private
scenarios, though not all private-for-public or public-for-public
scenarios. In the scenarios that involve taking property for public
purposes (whether by a private or public entity), Americans and
Chinese have more similar responses to each other. In these
circumstances, American and Chinese preferences are statistically
similar in both the patent and copyright conditions, while
Americans prefer slightly stronger rights in the personal property
and land scenarios. Americans do not prefer stronger property
rights to Chinese overall—rather, American preferences for
property rights in comparison to Chinese preferences are highly
context dependent.
173. Although there were significant differences across cultural groups in Study 2, such
differences were not found in Study 1. These results may indicate that there is a selection
effect among East Asians who choose to come to college in the United States. Such
individuals may bear property rights attitudes that are more similar to American attitudes.
174. The four that are equivalent, as noted in the prior section, concern patent and
copyright protection when the taking is for a public purpose.
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B.

Chinese Consistency, American Variation

One overarching result across the twelve vignette scenarios is
that Chinese tended to view property rights significantly more
consistently than did Americans. This uniformity held across the
type of property, the entity taking the property, and the use to
which the property was being put. As one indicator of this
difference in variance, average Chinese responses across the twelve
scenarios varied by about fifty percent, while American responses
varied tenfold. This Chinese consistency across property domains
is also revealed in participants’ responses to the general property
rights legal compliance questions. Here, the Chinese responses
across personal, real, and intellectual property displayed a higher
correlation than the American responses.
The Chinese consistency likely derives, at least in part, from
millennia of viewing all property as belonging to the Emperor, and
all people as the Emperor’s subjects. It may also have roots in the
history of property redistribution in China. These perspectives of
state ownership of all property would tend to remove distinctions
between different types of property and between public versus
private property rights.
The American variation in responses here is somewhat
beguiling in two regards. First, when queried in the abstract about
the importance of complying with both property rights in general
and intellectual property rights in particular, Americans rate such
importance relatively consistently across the different domains (as
do Chinese). When queried about specific factual patterns,
however, only Americans draw sharp distinctions.
Second, the distinctions that Americans draw across different
types of property rights are largely inconsistent with the U.S. law.
Although property laws concerning tangible personal goods, land,
and intellectual property do not mirror each other precisely, in
general, the law does not differentiate between the taking of
intangible property versus tangible property or the taking of
property (by a private party) for a publicly directed versus
privately directed purpose. There appears to be a significant
disconnect between American preferences for property law and the
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law on the books,175 a disconnect that is not limited to a distinction
between tangible and intangible property.
In this context, it is worth noting that we did not find
race/ethnicity differences in Study 1. There, White Americans, East
Asian Americans, and East Asians all had statistically similar
responses to each other on property rights. The divergence between
Americans and Chinese respondents in Study 2, on the other hand,
provides evidence that East Asian Americans and East Asians who
choose to attend college in the United States are culturally more
similar to Americans than are other Chinese, at least with respect
to property rights.
C.

Chinese Intellectual Property Exceptionalism, or American?

Our results suggest that those on all sides of the debates over
the origins of Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property rights
miss the mark in certain regards. Both those who argue that
Chinese attitudes are based in Confucian history and those who
disagree built their arguments by focusing on Chinese cultural and
legal developments in contrast to Western notions. That is, all
parties assumed some form of intellectual property exceptionalism
in Chinese culture. The studies reported here indicate that this is
not the case.
First, whatever the basis for Chinese attitudes towards
intellectual property rights, these attitudes appear to track Chinese
attitudes towards tangible property closely. Correlation does not
prove causation, but one likely explanation for this relationship is
that the basis for Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property is
the same as the basis for their attitude towards all property. To the
extent Chinese attitudes are exceptional, it is not their attitudes
towards intellectual property that are exceptional, but their
attitudes towards property in general.
Second, Chinese attitudes towards intellectual property bear a
significant resemblance to American attitudes towards intellectual
property in certain regards. In both the copyright and patent
175. Other research similarly has documented a disconnect between American beliefs
about what intellectual property law should be and what the law actually is. Anne A. Fast,
Kristina R. Olson & Gregory N. Mandel, Intuitive Intellectual Property Law: A NationallyRepresentative Test of the Plagiarism Fallacy, 12(9) PLoS ONE e0184315 (2017); Gregory N.
Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261, 308 (2014); Plagiarism
Fallacy, supra note 23, at 971.
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protection scenarios, Americans and Chinese had statistically
similar responses for both private and public takings so long as they
are for public benefit. The Chinese and American responses in the
personal and real property scenarios deviated to a greater extent
than the intellectual property scenarios. Here, the Chinese
preferred weaker property protection in each of the three transfer
type contexts.
D.

Purpose Matters

As noted above, Americans see a sharp distinction concerning
the use to which taken property is put. Americans consider it
significantly more acceptable for private or public parties to take
property for a public purpose than it is to take property for a private
purpose. This differentiation holds across all four types of property
tested here. Chinese participants display some distinction
concerning use as well, though not as sharp as Americans in any of
the four property domains.
On the other hand, neither Chinese nor Americans tended to
draw much of a distinction based on the user taking the property—
private or public.176 In other words, when the purpose of the taking
is held constant (that is, for a public purpose), respondents in each
domain did not distinguish between private versus public entities
engaging in the taking. These preferences run contrary to the law.
In both the United States and China, the legal consequences of
taking property can depend on whether it is a private party or the
government that is taking the property.177
Policymakers and scholars have long debated whether the
objectives of property law should be utilitarian or deontological in
nature. Utilitarians argue that property laws should be designed
instrumentally, to provide incentives for private parties to put
property to its highest social use.178 Some contend that efficiency
176. Chinese participants did not draw a significant distinction between the privatefor-public and public-for-public vignettes for any of the property types. Americans similarly
did not draw a significant distinction for personal, real, or patent property, but did draw a
distinction for copyright.
177. Jan G. Laitos & Teresa Helms Abel, The Role of Causation When Determining the
Proper Defendant in a Takings Lawsuit, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1181, 1182–83 (2012); Dennis
Schmelzer, Takings for Granted: The Convergence and Non-Convergence of Property Law in the
People’s Republic of China and the United States, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 133, 138 (2008).
178. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 40 (9th ed. 2014); Abraham Bell
& Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 547 (2005).
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objectives are the reason that society developed property laws in
the first instance, for example in an effort to resolve the tragedy of
the commons.179 While utilitarian views of property are
consequentialist, deontologists focus on people’s moral entitlement
to certain property rights.180 Most famously, for example,
John Locke’s labor theory of property rights posits that people
are naturally entitled to the fruits of their efforts.181 Rather than
taking an instrumentalist view of property law, deontological
proponents contend that there is and should be a moral basis for
property law.182
The results described above shed some light on how the public
tends to view property rights. In addition to being contrary to the
law, the American and Chinese distinctions in the study scenarios
according to the use of the property in question, but not according
to the user, are contrary to deontological conceptions of private
property rights.183 If private individuals are morally entitled to their
property interests, then the permissibility of a taking or
infringement should not depend on the use to which the property
is being put.184 Permissibility views that depend on the use to which
the property is put are more consistent with a utilitarian perception
of property rights.185 Across the personal, real, and intellectual
property scenarios tested here, the instrumentalist outcomes of the
use of property affected participant responses.
There was a significant public outcry in the United States
following the Supreme Court’s decision in Kelo v. City of New
London,186 which upheld the City’s exercise of their eminent domain
179. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Demsetz,
supra note 98, at 356.
180. Micah Elazar, “Public Use” and the Justification of Takings, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 249,
253 (2004); Heidi M. Hurd, Justifiably Punishing the Justified, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2203, 2210 (1992).
181. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 17 (Thomas P. Reardon ed.,
Liberal Arts Press 1952) (1690); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 11–12 (1985).
182. G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 45, at 52 (S.W. Dyde trans., 1996) (1896);
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982); Merrill & Smith,
supra note 99, at 1894.
183. Elazar, supra note 180, at 253; Hurd, supra note 180, at 2210.
184. D. Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 36, 40–41 (2009);
Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 1882.
185. POSNER, supra note 178, at 41; Merrill & Smith, supra note 99, at 1881–82.
186. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see Janice Nadler & Shari Seidman
Diamond, Eminent Domain and the Psychology of Property Rights: Proposed Use, Subjective
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power in taking real property.187 The Court in Kelo focused on the
public use to which the property would be put in upholding the
government’s action under the Takings Clause of the
Constitution.188 This study suggests that the Court’s focus on public
use is consistent with public preferences for how property rights
should be determined in general. The negative reaction to Kelo thus
may have had more to do with whether the use in question was
actually public—here, a governmental taking exercised by a private
party for development purposes189—than whether it was
inappropriate for the Court to focus on public use in takings
cases.190 These results are consistent with an earlier property rights
study in relation to Kelo, which found that Americans believed that
a government taking of real property was more justified when the
planned use had a more legitimate public purpose.191
E.

Preferencing Personal Property

Another finding that stands out in the results is the participants’
preference for protecting personal property rights. Both Americans
and Chinese concluded that personal property rights should be
protected more rigorously than other types of property rights.
Strikingly, this preference for personal property rights over rights
in land existed whether the land vignette involved merely trespass
(Study 1) or the full taking of real property (Study 2).
American participants responded across the board that
personal property rights should be protected to a greater extent
Attachment, and Taker Identity, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 713 (2008); Timothy Sandefur, The
“Backlash” So Far: Will Americans Get Meaningful Eminent Domain Reform?, 2006 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 709, 711 (2006) (discussing the moral outrage about the Kelo decision and how this
backlash was inspiring statutory reforms in state legislatures); Ilya Somin, The Limits of
Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100, 2101 (2009) (reporting
on a survey of public opinion about Kelo and concluding, “[t]he Supreme Court’s decision
in Kelo v. City of New London generated a massive backlash from across the political
spectrum”). But see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1412 (2006) (surveying the academic criticism of Kelo and arguing that they
are ill-conceived and misguided).
187. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 469.
188. Id. at 488–89.
189. Id. at 483–86.
190. See John Fee, Eminent Domain and the Sanctity of Home, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 783
(2006) (arguing that the public use doctrine developed in Kelo does not adequately protect
against the taking of residential property).
191. See generally Nadler & Diamond, supra note 186.
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than other types of property rights. Chinese participants responded
that personal property rights should be more protected than land
or patents, and their ratings for personal property and copyright
did not statistically differ.
The comparison between the personal property and copyright
vignettes is particularly worthy of note. In the former, the
individual at issue in the scenario takes fifty tangible copies of a
textbook and sells them to college classmates. In the latter, the
individual scans a copyrighted textbook and sells access to fifty
college classmates. In each scenario the property owner incurs the
same financial loss. Americans viewed these two scenarios starkly
differently, while Chinese viewed them similarly.
In the context of Kelo, it is worth noting that the government’s
constitutional takings power applies equally to personal
property192 and effectively to intellectual property as well.193 Given
the preferences for personal property protection expressed by the
study participants here, it is possible that the public outcry against
takings would be even stronger in a personal property case than it
was in Kelo.194
Professor Margaret Radin famously posited that some property
is “personal,” not in the traditional sense of “personal property,”
but in the sense that ownership and control over it is essential to
individual personhood.195 This normative view of property law
192. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2426 (2015); Steven J. Eagle, Property Rights
After Horne, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 669 (2016).
193. 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (mandating that the government pay “reasonable and entire
compensation” (a) “whenever an invention . . . covered by a patent . . . is used or
manufactured by or for the United States” and (b) “whenever the copyright in any work
protected under the copyright laws [is] infringed by the United States”); Thomas F. Cotter,
Do Federal Uses of Intellectual Property Implicate the Fifth Amendment?, 50 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531–
32 (1998) (noting that “the Federal Tort Claims Act permits trademark owners to file claims
against the United States for the violation of state trademark law” and that even though “no
federal statute explicitly authorizes suits against the United States for violations of federal
trademark law . . . , if the federal government’s dilution of a trademark can be characterized
as a taking of private property for public use, the owner may be able to obtain compensation
from the government under the Tucker Act”).
194. Professor Stephanie Stern has argued that there is scant empirical support for the
strong emphasis that legislators placed on the psychological primacy of residential property
rights following Kelo. Stephanie M. Stern, Residential Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of
Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009). The results here do not speak significantly to the
ownership of home but do provide empirical support for the value that people place on
personal property.
195. Radin, supra note 182, at 957–58.
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suggests that certain property is integral to personal autonomy,
liberty, and human flourishing, and that property rights should be
protected in order to promote such goals.196 Other property, Radin
argues, is “fungible”; it can be bought and sold without injury to
personhood interests, and therefore should be entitled to lesser
protection.197 The results here provide some support for Radin’s
personhood theory of property law. For even seemingly mundane
property, such as textbooks, the study participants attached
meaning to the ownership of the object in question.
F.

The Psychology of Property Rights

With regard to self-construal, the results of these studies were
mixed. Consistent with considerable past work,198 in Studies 1 and
2, White American participants endorsed independent selfconstrual more than East Asian students (Study 1) and Chinese
students (Study 2), but did not differ from East Asian American
students (Study 1). In contrast, we did not observe the expected
difference on interdependent self-construal. In Study 1, the groups
did not differ in their level of interdependence, and in Study 2,
White Americans actually endorsed an interdependent selfconstrual more than Chinese participants. Whether the latter effect
was a spurious finding, the result of translation difficulties (that
somehow had not affected the independent measure), a product of
the uniqueness associated with college student populations, or a
reflection of a generational change since the scale was first
constructed,199 is an open question. Nonetheless, these findings
demonstrate that in making comparisons across countries, based on
assumptions of cultural differences, it remains critical to continue
to measure these cultural differences as it may not be fair to assume
they remain constant across time or study.
We can also speculatively connect the vignette ratings to the
self-construal findings. The disapproval of the private-for-private
case was especially strong among Americans. Perhaps their higher
rates of both independent self-construal and interdependent

196. Id. Contra Stephen J. Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin’s Theory
of Property and Personhood, 45 STAN. L. REV. 347, 350–52 (1993).
197. Radin, supra note 182, at 978–79.
198. Oyserman et al., supra note 119, at 3–72.
199. Singelis, supra note 128, at 580.
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self-construal particularly impacted this case. In private-for-private
transfers, the personal costs to the owner (which might be
especially salient to someone with an independent self-construal)
were not outweighed by a concern for the larger group (which
might be salient to someone with an interdependent self-construal).
The literature on self-construal has investigated how self-construal
can influence cognition. For example, representations of the self can
impact spatial judgments,200 attention to context,201 and
engagement in situational versus dispositional attributions.202 The
current findings add to this work by suggesting that self-construal
may also be useful in thinking about third-party judgments.
Further, the current findings expand the psychology of
ownership literature by demonstrating that people’s intuitions
about the acceptability of using another’s property shift as a
function of how (or for whom) that property is used. Previous
research demonstrated that adults and even young children focus
on current ownership when determining who has control over use
of an object, even when a non-owner could more effectively use the
object.203 However, when faced with dilemmas about an owner’s
property being used against the owner’s will in order to prevent
harm to others, adults and children as young as four years of age
will deny the rights of owners in favor of the good deed.204 In the
current work, we observed that whom the use benefited impacted
the perceived acceptability of using the property. We found that
people in both cultures viewed property used for the public
similarly and more favorably than property used for private use,
suggesting a common underlying utilitarian approach to
evaluating these scenarios. That is, across cultures, helping more
people was particularly important. This finding is consistent with

200. Aradhna Krishna et al., The Effect of Self-Construal on Spatial Judgments, 35 J.
CONSUMER RES. 337, 337–48 (2008).
201. Richard S. Lewis et al., Culture and Context: East Asian American and European
American Differences in P3 Event-Related Potentials and Self-Construal, 34 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCH. BULL. 623, 623–34 (2008).
202. Morris & Peng, supra note 12, at 949–71; Shigehiro Oishi et al., Cultural Variation in
the Use of Current Life Satisfaction to Predict the Future, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 434,
434–45 (2000).
203. Sunae Kim & Charles W. Kalish, Children’s Ascriptions of Property Rights with
Changes of Ownership, 24 COGNITIVE DEV. 322, 322–36 (2009).
204. Karen R. Neary & Ori Friedman, Young Children Give Priority to Ownership When
Judging Who Should Use an Object, 85 CHILD DEV. 326, 326–37 (2013).
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other findings in moral psychology in which providing a benefit for
greater numbers of people is generally favored.205
CONCLUSION
For years, legal and policy experts have debated and critiqued
Chinese approaches to intellectual property rights. Despite a
plethora of discussion on the matter, no one has previously tested
actual American and Chinese property rights attitudes. The studies
reported here present a first step forward. The results indicate that
Americans and Chinese have richer and more complex preferences
for property rights than previously considered, and that
comparison of attitudes across cultures is not as straightforward as
commonly assumed.
While Americans do tend to prefer stronger property rights,
they do not do so in all situations, and their responses are
significantly mediated by the context. Chinese are more consistent
in their property rights views, though, like Americans, their
preferences often do not align with actual law.
The variations across and complexities within each culture are
likely intertwined with the historical and cultural differences across
the two societies. While our results offer significant new
information concerning American and Chinese preferences for
property rights, they also only begin to scratch the surface. Both the
United States and China have rich cultural diversity within their
societies, which our studies did not explore. Beyond China and the
United States there are many other countries whose differing
histories and cultures likely yield alternative perspectives on
property. The studies reported here open up many new avenues for
research concerning property, intellectual property, and culture.

205. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK: ESSAYS IN MORAL
THEORY (William Parent ed., 1986); Paul Conway & Bertram Gawronski, Deontological and
Utilitarian Inclinations in Moral Decision Making: A Process Dissociation Approach, 104 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 216, 216–35 (2013); Joshua D. Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation
of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 SCIENCE 2105, 2105–08 (2001).
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